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UNITED STATES v. GELB:* THE SECOND
CIRCUIT'S DISAPPOINTING TREATMENT OF THE
FAIR CROSS-SECTION GUARANTEE
INTRODUCTION
The Sixth Amendment guarantees every criminal defendant
the right to a trial by an impartial jury.' To protect this guaran-
tee and to ensure the legitimacy of jury decisions it is essential
that the process of jury selection be impartial.2 As a result, dis-
criminatory jury selection procedures have historically been an
issue of profound constitutional concern.3
* 881 F.2d 1155 (2d Cir.) (before Lumbard, Newman & Miner, JJ.; opinion per
Miner, J.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 994 (1989).
1 U.S. CONST. amend. VI states in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed ......
At his inaugural address in 1801, Thomas Jefferson indicated that "trials by juries
impartially selected" were a fundamental principle of our government, which suggests
that the Sixth Amendment drafters were concerned about jury selection when placing
the word 'impartial' into the Sixth Amendment. 1 MssAGE.S AND PAPERS OF THE PR ES-
DENTS 312 (J. Richardson ed. 1897). See also Note, The Cross-Section Requirement and
Jury Impartiality, 73 CALF. L. REv. 1555, 1558 (1985) ("The concept of impartiality
consequently has come to designate both the detachment of the selection process and the
selection of jurors."). However, the representative cross-section requirement, a right enti-
tling defendants to jury selection systems free of unfair exclusion was not "officially"
recognized until Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975); see note 6 and accompanying
text infra.
2 See Massaro, Peremptories or Peers? - Rethinking Sixth Amendment Doctrine,
Images and Procedures, 64 N.C.L. REv. 501, 504 (1986) (recognizing that jury selection
procedures must appear fair because "[w]hat a jury looks like to the community will
affect the community's respect for the verdict").
Massaro recognizes that the legitimacy of jury decisions will become highly suspect
when jury selection procedures do not correspond to people's image of a fair jury. Id. at
517-19 (citing Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), overruled in part, Batson v. Ken-
tucky, 476 U.S. 79, 101 (1986)). In Swain a black defendant was convicted of raping a
white woman by an all white jury so composed after the prosecutor eliminated all pro-
spective black jurors through use of peremptory challenges. The Supreme Court upheld
the defendant's conviction, finding that the prosecutor's discriminatory use of perempto-
ries to systematically eliminate prospective black jurors did not violate the 14th Amend-
ment. Swain, 380 U.S. at 224. See also J. VAN DYxn, JURY SzM Czn0 PaoCznURE& OUR
UNcERTAiN ComTmurmNT To REPRESNTATIVrE PAANLs 2 (1977) (claiming that "the per-
ception that the composition of a jury affects its verdict is the basis of challenges by
defendants to the juries that convicted them").
3 The most significant early jury selection case was the venerable and oft-cited deci-
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While courts have consistently held that the Constitution
does not require a defendant's petit jury4 to be of any particular
composition,5 a defendant's right to a fair cross-section of the
community on the jury venire is constitutionally entrenched as
"fundamental to the jury trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amend-
ment."' A constitutionally fair cross-section requires that "the
jury wheels, pools of names, panels or venires from which the
sion by the Supreme Court in Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879) (where the
Court invalidated a facially discriminatory statute that permitted only white male adults
to serve as jurors, holding that the exclusion of blacks from the pool of jurors from which
the petit jury was selected violated the defendant's right to equal protection under the
law).
4 The choice of the petit jury, the jury that actually decides a defendant's fate, is
the final and arguably most important phase of the jury selection process. However, this
Comment focuses on the constitutional problems surrounding the composition of the
jury pool, and the defendant's own venire, randomly selected, from which the petit jury
is ultimately chosen.
The typical stages of jury selection in a criminal case under the federal method of
jury selection can be described as follows: Potential jurors are randomly selected from a
master jury wheel created from a master source list-a particular source of names, such
as a list of registered voters, a list of those with driver's licenses, or multiple source lists
aimed at a more representative pool of prospective jurors. After this initial selection, the
screening process begins with potential jurors filling out a jury questionnaire. This quali-
fication process will result in the exemption and exclusion of some jurors. The jury selec-
tion officials may also have some discretionary authority to excuse potential jurors based
on legitimate requests by jurors or based on the subjective judgment of officials (al-
though the latter is disfavored). This process produces a list of individuals qualified for
service, which is called the jury pool or qualified pool. Upon need, jurors are selected at
random from the jury pool and summoned for jury service. Jurors assigned for a specific
case are referred to as the venire or panel. The petit jury is ultimately selected from the
venire after the voir dire stage, in which jurors respond to specific questions and may be
excused for cause, excused for "no cause"-where each side uses its allotted number of
peremptory challenges--and excused by the court for hardship reasons. See B. BONAnA &
E. KRAuss, JURYWORM SYSTEMTIC TECHNIQUES (2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter "JuRYWORK"].
See note 15, regarding jury selection procedures in New York.
I The diverse nature of our society makes the notion of completely representative
petit juries administratively unrealistic. The Strauder Court noted early on that a de-
fendant had no "right to a grand or petit jury composed in whole or in part of persons of
his own race or color . . ." 100 U.S. at 305. While this list is by no means exhaustive,
the following decisions have affirmed this principle. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85
n.5 (1986); Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 n.20 (1979); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419
U.S. 522, 538 (1975); Fay v. New York, 322 U.S. 261, 284 (1947); Thiel v. Southern Pac.
Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946).
' Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530. The implications of this decision should not be under-
stated. Essentially, Taylor establishes the notion that jury selection procedures are con-
stitutionally safeguarded, irrespective of the substantive fairness of the petit jury's ver-
dict. Hence, even in the absence of any bias or prejudice by a jury that convicts a
defendant, the defendant's constitutional rights may have been compromised, thereby
warranting a reversal. See text accompanying notes 33-40 infra (discussing Taylor).
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juries are drawn must not systematically exclude distinctive
groups in the community .... ,,7
The Second Circuit recently had occasion to examine the
fair cross-section protection in United States v. Gelb." In Gelb
the defendant alleged that a practice of granting Jewish individ-
uals postponement of service during a three-week period encom-
passing the major Jewish holidays was an exclusionary jury se-
lection procedure which denied him his constitutional right to a
fair cross-section. While the court correctly rejects Gelb's chal-
lenge, its superficial treatment of the fair cross-section issue was
flawed.' The Second Circuit's sparse opinion fails to address the
question of exclusionary procedures raised by Gelb. Instead the
court resolves Gelb's claim through an inflexible application of
constitutional doctrine, relying on suspect policy found outside
the Second Circuit.10
7 Id. at 538. See also Massaro, supra note 2, at 533 (The fair cross-section is one
drawn from a pool from "which no distinctive group in the community is under-
represented due to systematic exclusion in the jury selection process."). Central to this
guarantee is that it ensures only a venire of randomness, one free of systematic exclusion.
It does not ensure any particular venire. See Note, supra note 1, at 1565 ("Rather than
being entitled to a [fair] cross-sectional venire, then, the challenger has a right only to a
fair chance, based on random draw, of having a jury drawn from a representative panel
At this stage the paramount concern is procedural detachment.").
a 881 F.2d 1155 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 994 (1989). Gelb's fair cross-section
challenge is unusual, unlike more "traditional" jury selection challenges--facially dis-
criminatory jury selection statutes or prosecutorial misconduct in the exercise of pe-
remptory challenges.
9 Gelb is not alone in his failure to receive a favorable ruling on religion.based chal-
lenges. In a very terse opinion, not even cited by the Gelb court, the Second Circuit held
that a defendant was not denied a fair cross-section of the community when the district
court refused to grant an adjournment for the eight-day Passover season and made ef-
forts to accommodate prospective jurors of Jewish faith by announcing that there would
be no session on the principal holidays. United States v. Suskin, 450 F.2d 596 (2d Cir.
1971). Additionally, other circuits have treated fair cross-section challenges regarding the
absence of Jewish people from the jury pool with similar brevity and disfavor. See, e4.,
Scott v. Dugger, 891 1.2d 800, 804 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, Il S. Ct. 224 (1990),
(where despite evidence that prospective Jewish jurors were excused from service for the
holiday of Yom Kippur, defendant's claim that he lacked a fair crozs-section of the com-
munity because jury selection was conducted on the holiday was still deemed "merit-
less"); Grech v. Wainwright, 492 F.2d 747 (5th Cir. 1974) (where the court upheld the
district court's discretion to exclude Jewish jurors in the face of a Sixth Amendment
challenge). See text accompanying notes 139-52 infra discussing why the Second Circuit
ultimately reached the right result in Gelb.
10 See United States v. Bucci, 839 F.2d 825 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 844
(1988) (rejecting appellant's claim that the government impermissibly excluded Italian-
Americans based on the presumption that individuals whose surname3 ended with a
vowel were of Italian ethnicity); United States v. Sgro, 816 F.2d 30 (1st Cir. 1937), cert.
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As a consequence of the Second Circuit's troubling analysis,
the significance of the fair cross-section guarantee has been di-
luted: defendants raising religion- or ethnicity-based jury selec-
tion challenges may be unable to demonstrate that they are be-
ing deprived of the right. Moreover, the court's limited
treatment of the fair cross-section requirement raises questions
about a subtle distinction between traditional jury selection
challenges and religion- or ethnicity-based jury selection chal-
lenges.11 This is particularly true in light of the more expansive
readings the fair cross-section requirement has received in other
contexts.
12
Fundamental to the Sixth Amendment guarantee is the idea
that for a jury to be fair, it must be free of any bias. However,
since the jury is composed of human beings with human
prejudices, impartiality can never really be guaranteed. The Su-
preme Court has enunciated a three-part test that a defendant
must satisfy in order to make out a Sixth Amendment violation.
In Duren v. Missouri3 the Court held that a group alleged to be
excluded must be a distinctive group in the community, that the
representation of this group in venires must not be unfair and
unreasonable in relation to the numbers of such persons in the
community and that this group's underrepresentation must be
due to systematic exclusion in the jury selection process.1 4
This Comment argues that when confronting fair cross-sec-
tion challenges appellate courts must not mechanically apply the
second element of the Duren test. Defendants have no conclu-
denied, 484 U.S. 1063 (1988) (rejecting appellant's challenge that the government vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause by using its peremptory challenge to exclude the only
two jurors whose surnames sounded Italian). See text accompanying notes 86, 90-93 infra
discussing the facts of these cases.
11 See text accompanying notes 133-38 infra discussing how as a result of Gelb the
different fair cross-section challenges may not be treated equally.
12 In Roman v. Abrams, 822 F.2d 214 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1052
(1989), the Second Circuit affirmed a reading of the fair cross-section protection which
found that the Sixth Amendment was implicated at the challenges stage of the selection
process. The court held that a prosecutor's invidious use of peremptory challenges to
systematically exclude a cognizable group is a violation of the Sixth Amendment, which
guarantees the defendant the possibility of a jury that represents a fair cross-section of
the community. Roman, 822 F.2d at 224 (citing McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113, 1125
(2d Cir. 1984), cert. granted and vacated, 478 U.S. 1001 (1986)). See also note 51 infra
discussing expansive notions of standing for violations of the fair cross-section guarantee.
23 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
24 Id. at 364.
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sive way to show unreasonable representation of religious or eth-
nic groups to the trial court, since no statistical data exist re-
garding any specific religious or ethnic group's representation on
the jury pool.15 In view of this tremendous proof problem, trial
courts hearing jury selection challenges under Duren should per-
mit defendants initially to make a less rigid prima facie showing
of unreasonable representation, thereby shifting the emphasis to
whether the defendant has demonstrated that this legally recog-
nized group has been systematically excluded from the jury se-
lection process.' 6 Similarly, appellate courts should evaluate
25 Jury selection procedures in New York illustrate the problem. Like the federal
jury selection procedures already noted (see note 4 supra), the selection of potential
jurors is made by a process aimed at gaining a representative cross-section. N.Y. Jun
LAW. § 500 (ConsoL Supp. 1991). The commissioner of jurors selects name3 at random
from voter registration lists, as well as any lists specified by the chief administrator of
the courts (for example, utility subscribers, those with driver's licenses, or registered
owners of cars). Id. §§ 506-507. From this master list, the commissioner then determines
the qualifications of a prospective juror from the information provided by the qualifica-
tion questionnaire, including requests for service in certain months, requests not to serve
in certain months, and any automatic disqualifications or claimed exemptions. Id. § 509.
This process produces the "jury pool." Members of the jury pool are selected at random
to serve on a particular venire.
The problem for defendants like Gelb concerns the qualification form. Neither the
New York form (id. § 513), nor the federal form (28 U.S.C. § 1869 (1963)) provides infor-
mation on the religious or ethnic background of jurors. Without this as a source of jury
pool composition data, defendants are left with the virtually impossible burden of satis-
fying the second prong of Duren. In short, defendants may be unable to demonstrate a
group's significant underrepresentation unless a lesser showing is allowed.
16 On its face the Duren test requires defendants to show the trial court significant
underrepresentation on "venires" from which the petit jurors are selected. Duren, 439
U.S. at 364. However, in Gelb, the Second Circuit's analysis of what occurred in the
district court focused on the defendant's inability to demonstrate the unreasonable rep-
resentation of Jewish people on his own venire. Gelb, 881 F.2d at 1162 ("Gelb's sixth
amendment claim must fail for lack of a showing that Jews were underrepresented in his
venire.").
In considering Duren challenges, this Comment supports the reading of Duren that
allows trial courts to focus on a defendant's own venire, as a representative sample of the
jury pool, in determining whether a defendant has demonstrated the underrepresenta-
tion of a legally distinctive group. See note 15 supra describing the difficulty of uncover-
ing jury pool composition data on religious or ethnic groups. Other circuits have followed
this position when applying the second element of Duren. See, e.g., Singleton v. Lock-
hart, 871 F.2d 1395, 1398 (8th Cir.) (representation of blacks on defendant's venire was
statistically reasonable where blacks made up 23.7o of the venire and 27.27 of the pop-
ulation), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 874 (1989); Trujillo v. Sullivan, 815 F.2d 597, 610 (10th
Cir. 1987) (rejecting defendant's Duren claim on grounds that defendant's showing that
a distinctive group's representation in the jury venire was not fair and reasonable in
relation to the number of such persons in the community was insufficient as a violation
absent a showing that the venire's underrepresentation was the product of the jury selec-
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Duren challenges in this principled and realistic manner, or the
Sixth Amendment fair cross-section requirement Will be ren-
dered a dead letter for defendants seeking to show the system-
atic exclusion of groups other than race- or gender-based
groups.17
Part I of this Comment surveys the history of the fair cross-
section requirement and how it developed into a fundamental
constitutional guarantee. Part II examines the factual and proce-
dural history of Gelb's case at both the district and circuit court
levels. Part III critically evaluates the circuit court's reasoning,
challenging the court's wisdom in resting its decision on the sec-
ond prong of the Duren test, which required Gelb to show that
Jews were underrepresented in venires in a manner dispropor-
tionate to the number of Jews in the Eastern District. This sec-
tion offers instead Gelb's failure to demonstrate the systematic
exclusion of Jews pursuant to the third prong of Duren as the
more effective resting place for the court's decision.
tion process), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 929 (1987). But see, e.g., Timmel v. Phillips, 799
F.2d 1083, 1087 (5th Cir. 1986) (rejecting defendant's Duren challenge at the second
element, the court held that merely showing one case of alleged underrepresentation
does not rise to a "general" underrepresentation required for establishing a prima facie
case); United States v. Miller, 771 F.2d 1219, 1228 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that the
Duren Court's use of the plural when describing "venires" from which "juries" are se-
lected indicated that a violation of the underrepresentation element cannot be premised
on underrepresentation on a single jury venire).
Allowing for this interpretation will focus Duren challenges on the element of sys-
tematic exclusion. Defendants' rights are not automatically violated by a mere showing
of statistical imbalances between a group's representation on a venire and its percentage
of the community. See Singleton, 871 F.2d at 1399 ("Evidence of a discrepancy on a
single venire panel cannot demonstrate systematic exclusion."). In showing systematic
exclusion defendants will have to go beyond their own venire to demonstrate why the
underrepresentation is a product of the system-a showing that may inevitably demon-
strate significant underrepresentation on other venires. Therefore, where a defendant has
no reason to believe and cannot make a prima facie showing that a group's underrepre-
sentation was the result of exclusionary practices inherent in the jury selection system,
Duren challenges will not succeed.
With regard to the systematic exclusion prong of the analysis, Gelb's argument Is
that Jewish people were being granted requests for postponement of service until after
the Jewish "holiday season"-from September until early October-by the jury commis-
sioner. It was this practice of postponements for Jewish people that Gelb ultimately ar-
gued was the "systematic exclusion" of Jewish people. See text accompanying note 52
infra describing Gelb's evidence regarding systematic exclusion.
17 These groups may acquire jury composition pool data from the federal qualifica-
tion questionnaire filled out by potential federal jurors.
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I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE FAIR CROSS-SECTION
REQUIREMENT
On its face, the Sixth Amendment does not provide an ex-
plicit fair cross-section requirement for defendants. s Rather,
the constitutional guarantee of a fair cross-section is the product
of judicial evolution."9 Early cases addressing fairness in jury se-
lection procedures were deeply concerned with the Fourteenth
Amendment right of the newly emancipated black man not to be
excluded from serving on a jury.20 Although the defendant in
these cases raised the Sixth Amendment challenge, 21 the Su-
preme Court's attention and rhetoric were focused on the equal
rights of the excluded person and not squarely on the defend-
ant's right to a fair trial.2 1 In essence, early jury selection chal-
2' See note 1 supra.
19 Id. See, e.g., Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979) (establishing the standards
for when a fair cross-section deprivation has occurred); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522
(1975) (holding this right to be an essential ingredient of the Sixth Amendment);
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (holding Sixth Amendment jury selection pro-
vision applicable to state governments via the Fourteenth Amendment); Glasser v.
United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86 (1942) (where the Court introduced the "cross-section of
the community" as the goal of jury selection procedures); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128,
130 (1940) (where the Court found representativeness to be an important characteristic
of the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury). See text accompanying notes 20-47
infra.
20 See, e.g., Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S. 316, 319 (1906) ("lIlt is the settled doctrine of
this court that 'whenever by any action of a State... all persons of the African race are
excluded, solely because of their race or color... the equal protection of the laws is
denied to [the defendant].' ") (quoting Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442, 447 (1900)); Gibson
v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 580-81 (1896) C'.... a denial to citizens of the African race,
BECAUSE OF THEm COLOR, of the right or privilege accorded white citizens of participat-
ing as jurors in the administration of justice would be a discrimination against the for-
mer, inconsistent with the [14th] amendment. . ."); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.. 370, 397
(1880) (The fact that no black person had ever been summoned for jury duty in the
state, although the black population in 1880 exceeded 26,000, was prima facin evidence
of denial of equal protection under the Constitution).
' The systematic exclusion by state law jury selection statute3 did not result in
challenges by the excluded members, but rather, by the defendant. Hence, defendants
were able to escape conviction by vindicating the equal protection rights of others. For a
contemporary illustration of state-sanctioned discrimination during peremptories, see
Powers v. Ohio, 111 S.Ct. 1364 (1991) (where in reversing a white defendant's murder
conviction, the Court held that the defendant had standing to vindicate the equal pro-
tection rights of black venirepersons who had been unfairly discriminated against during
jury selection procedures).
2 Concern that Blacks not be branded or stigmatized by a statute which excluded
them from jury service was at the core of the Strauder decision:
The very fact that colored people are singled out and expressly denied by a
statute all right to participate in the administration of the law, as jurors, be-
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lenges did not rely on whether particular groups had been in-
cluded to satisfy a defendant's right to an impartial jury; rather,
they asserted the rights of the jurors.
The Supreme Court did not consider whether the inclusion
of particular community members was a necessary element of
the right to an impartial jury until 1940. In Smith v. Texas23 the
Court planted the seed for the Sixth Amendment fair cross-sec-
tion requirement through a dramatic depiction of the jury's role,
which included an explicit reference to the need for community
representativeness on the jury.24
The Smith Court's suggestion was expanded just two years
later in Glasser v. United States, a jury selection case not in-
volving the Fourteenth Amendment in which the Court used the
words "cross-section of the community" for the first time.23 The
cause of their color, though they are citizens, and may be in other respects
fully qualified, is practically a brand upon them, affixed by the law, an asser-
tion of their inferiority, and a stimulant to that race prejudice which is an
impediment to securing to individuals of the race that equal justice which the
law aims to secure to all others.
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879).
23 311 U.S. 128 (1940). In Smith, the Court reversed a black defendant's conviction
on the grounds that although Texas's statutory scheme for selecting grand jurors was
facially neutral, its impact on blacks was discriminatory and a violation of the equal
protection of the law. Id. at 131-32. Specifically, grand jury figures for that state from
1931 to 1934 indicated that only 18 of 512 people summoned for grand jury duty were
black. Id. at 129.
24 The Court in Smith went so far as to suggest that the notion of a representative
jury is a foundational part of democracy, which is undercut by the exclusion of groups
due to racial discrimination.
It is part of the established tradition in the use of juries as instruments of
public justice that the jury be a body truly representative of the community.
For racial discrimination to result in the exclusion from jury service of other-
wise qualified groups not only violates our Constitution and the laws enacted
under it but is at war with our basic concepts of a democratic society ....
311 U.S. at 130 (Black, J.). See also Massaro, supra note 2, at 532 ("Justice Black's
description of the jury as a body 'truly representative of the community' went beyond a
jury free from discrimination and hinted that a defendant may have an affirmative right
to have certain members of the community included in the jury.").
The notion of representativeness may wrongly suggest that a defendant is entitled to
a petit jury composed in a particular manner that represents the defendant's community;
the notion of representativeness in fact refers to a system free from systematic exclusion,
ensuring the chance that the jury will be representative. No case has ever held that the
notion of community representativeness extends to the petit jury. See note 5 supra.
25 315 U.S. 60, 84, 86 (1942) (defendant challenged the exclusion of women not
members of the League of Women Voters under the 5th and 6th amendments on
grounds that League members attended jury classes which were biased in favor of the
prosecution).
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Court held that "while officials may exercise discretion to assure
a competent, representative body, they must not allow the desire
for competent jurors to lead them into selections which do not
comport with the concept of a jury as a cross-section of the com-
munity."2 Therefore, implicit in the Glasser Court's holding,
the goal of jury administrators responsible for empaneling the
venire from the source lists must be to strive for a jury that re-
flects all parts of the community.27
In a legislative commitment to the fair selection of jurors
from a cross-section of the community, Congress passed the
Federal Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968.28 The Act
sought to eliminate any possible discrimination in jury selection
procedures that might hinder representative venires from being
empaneled by mandating that selection for jury service be ac-
complished by a method of random selection.29 Congress be-
lieved that if the selection of jurors was done at random, repre-
sentative juries would ultimately result.30
Despite these attempts at recognizing a fair cross-section re-
quirement, the Supreme Court did not solidify a defendant's
constitutional right to a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of
the community until its 1970s decisions in Taylor v. Louisiana3'
and Duren v. Missouri.2 In Taylor, the Court questioned
whether the presence of a fair cross-section of the community on
26 315 U.S. at 86.
See text accompanying notes 28-30 infra describing how The Federal Jury Selec-
tion and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1869 (1968), sought to remove discretion
from jury administrators in selecting the venire, emphasizing the principle of random
selection. In addition, certain source lists that the commisioners may use at their discre-
tion are disfavored. These disfavored lists include tax lists and property lists. JURYVionX,
supra note 4, at 5-17 to 5-18.
28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1869 (1968).
2 Id. § 1861 ("[T]he policy of the United States [is] that all litigants in Federal
courts entitled to trial by jury shall have the right to grand and petit juries selected at
random from a fair cross section of the community in the district or division wherein the
court convenes.").
30 As one respected jury scholar has noted, by putting together a complete list of
eligible jurors and selecting randomly from it, "the laws of statistics will produce repre-
sentative juries most of the time." J. VAN Dvm, supra note 2, at 18.
31 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (defendant successfully challenged the constitutionality of the
Louisiana jury selection scheme that excluded women from service unless they
volunteered).
439 U.S. 357 (1979) (defendant successfully challenged the constitutionality of the
Missouri jury selection scheme that allowed women automatic exemptions if they so
requested).
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the jury venire was an essential feature of the defendant's Sixth
Amendment guarantee to an impartial jury trial.33 Taylor, a
male defendant, challenged the constitutionality of Louisiana's
jury selection scheme, which provided that women could not be
chosen for jury service unless they volunteered.3 4 Taylor be-
lieved he had been denied his constitutional right to a fair trial
by a jury of a representative segment of the population, since his
175-person venire had no women on it.35
In reversing the defendant's kidnapping conviction, the
Court held that "the selection of a petit jury from a representa-
tive cross section of the community is an essential component of
the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. 38 The Court rea-
soned that such a view was consistent with the adoption of fed-
eral legislation governing jury selection 37 and was not inconsis-
tent with its jury selection opinions since 1940.38
11 419 U.S. at 526. The Court reached the fair cross-section issue as a result of its
historic decision in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), which held that the Sixth
Amendment provision for a jury trial bound the states through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Id. The Court thus had to decide if the fair cross-section protection was a feature
of the Sixth Amendment with which Louisiana would be required to comply.
"419 U.S. at 523. The Louisiana statute, which was repealed subsequent to the
conviction of the defendant but prior to the Court's decision, provided in pertinent part:
"A woman shall not be selected for jury service unless she has previously filed with the
clerk of the court of the parish in which she resides a written declaration of her desire to
be subject to jury service." LA. CODE CMhi PROc. ANN. art. 402 (West 1967) (repealed).
For a discussion of a defendant's standing to bring a claim that a group other than
his or her own has been excluded in violation of the fair cross-section protection, see note
51 infra.
35 419 U.S. at 524.
8 Id. at 528.
3' See text accompanying notes 28-30 supra.
" The Court did not look to a precise doctrine in rendering its decision. Rather, it
found that "the unmistakable import of [its] opinions ... since 1940 [and] not repudi-
ated by intervening decisions" made this decision a logical and necessary extension. 419
U.S. at 528.
Some of the intervening decisions the Court was referring to include: Peters v. Kiff,
407 U.S. 493 (1972) (white defendant can properly challenge discriminatory jury selec-
tion procedures against blacks); Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320 (1970) (Court af-
firmed a district court order directing Alabama jury commissioners and clerk to comprise
a jury selection list that did not racially discriminate against blacks but did not direct
that the governor place blacks as members of the jury commission); Brown v. Allen, 344
U.S. 443, 474 (1953) (Court found tax lists appropriate source for jury selection lists,
refusing to impose its own conception of the proper source, as long as the source reasona-
bly reflects a cross-section of the population suitable for the duty); Ballard v. United
States, 329 U.S. 187, 195 (1946) (Court reversed defendant's mail fraud conviction, find-
ing that the systematic exclusion of women from the jury system denies the defendant
the jury to which the law entitles him, as well as injuring the system, the law as an
[Vol. 57:341
JURY SELECTION
The Court found that women were "sufficiently numerous
and distinct from men" and that the Louisiana scheme did in
fact systematically eliminate women from the jury pool, thereby
denying the defendant his fundamental right to a fair cross-sec-
tion." Thus, for the first time, the Court recognized that the
scope of the impartial jury requirement extended beyond the
fairness of the petit jury to the distinctive constitutional inquiry
about the fairness of jury selection procedures.
In Duren v. Missouri the Court reversed the defendant's
conviction for first degree murder, and in doing so, confirmed
the fundamental nature' of the fair cross-section guarantee es-
tablished by the Taylor decision.42 The Court accepted the de-
fendant's argument that a jury selection scheme automatically
exempting women from service upon their request 43 systemati-
cally excluded women from jury venires.4 The Court also held
institution, the community and the democratic vision represented by the process in our
courts).
39 419 U.S. at 531. Specifically, 53% of the people eligible for jury service in Taylor'es
judicial district were women, yet from Dec. 8, 1971, until Nov. 3, 1972, only twelve fe-
males out of 1800 people were drawn to fill jury venires. Id. at 524.
40 See note 6 supra. Justice Rehnquist, who passionately dissented from the Taylor
majority, was not convinced that the fair cross-section principle is a feature that should
result in reversals absent a showing that this procedure produced some sort of visible
bias on the petit jury. Id. at 538-39 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ('The Court's opinion
reverses a conviction without a suggestion, much less a showing, that the appellant has
been unfairly treated or prejudiced in any way by the manner in which his jury was
selected.").
4 See note 6 supra.
42 Duren, 439 U.S. at 370. As he did in Taylor, Justice Rehnquist vociferously dis-
sented. Once again, it is the dramatic result, the reversal of a murder conviction, at
which his wrath is centered-
[Tihe only winners in today's decision are those in the category of petitioner,
now freed of his conviction of first-degree murder. They are freed not because
of any demonstrable unfairness at any stage of their trials, but because of the
Court's obsession that criminal venires represent a "fair cross-section" of the
community, whatever that may be. The losers are the remaining members of
that community-men and women seeking to do their duty as jurors and yet
minimize the inconvenience that such service entails, judicial administrators
striving to make the criminal justice system function, and the citizenry in gen-
eral seeking the incarceration of those convicted of serious crimes after a fair
trial
Id. at 377-78 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
"3 Mo. Rav. STAT. §494.031 (Supp. 1978)(repealed) provided in pertinent part:
The following persons shall, upon their timely application to the court, be ex-
cused from service as a juror, either grand or petit...
(2) Any woman who requests exemption before being sworn as a juror.
44 439 U.S. at 362-63. The defendant brought forth evidence that 54% of the popu-
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that the scheme led to the significant underrepresentation of
women on the defendant's jury venire: of fifty-three members
only five were women.45 In reaching its decision, the Court ex-
pressly created the three-prong test that a defendant must sat-
isfy to establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section
requirement, affirming the significance of this right regardless of
the actual composition of the jury involved. 46 Specifically a de-
fendant must show that: (1) the group alleged to be excluded is
a distinctive group in the community, (2) that the representation
of this group in the venires from which juries are selected is not
fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in
the community and (3) that the underrepresentation is due to
the systematic exclusion of the group in the jury selection
lation in his county were women (as of the 1970 census held to be valid) but that from
June-October 1975, and January-March 1976, only 26.7% of those summoned for service,
and only 14.5% of the weekly venires during the period in which his jury was selected,
were women.
45 Id. at 363.
,6 In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist demonstrated the ironic significance of a fair
cross-section requirement, which exists regardless of the petit jury actually empaneled:
"[U]nder the majority's fair-cross-section analysis, the underrepresentation of women of
jury venires in Jackson County, Mo., would entitle petitioner Duren to reversal of his
conviction even if the jury chosen in his case had been composed of all women." Id. at
373.
Until 1990, in the context of peremptory challenges, the Second Circuit would not
have allowed such a result, engaging in a bottom-line, "no harm, no foul" analysis, If
despite efforts at systematic exclusion through the discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges, the actual jury composed included representatives from the group sought to
be excluded, in numbers reasonable to that group's proportion in the community, the
court would not find a constitutional violation warranting a reversal. See, e.g., United
States v. Ruiz, 894 F.2d 501, 507 (2d Cir. 1990) (finding any analysis of whether a group
has in fact been unfairly excluded from the jury unnecessary where the prosecution ef-
fectively rebuts defendant's prima facie case of invidious use of peremptories by showing
neutral reasons for their exercise); United States v. Alvarado 891 F.2d 439, 445 (2d Cir.
1989) (finding that a petit jury composed of 25% blacks and Hispanics reflected a repre-
sentative jury in a district composed of 29% blacks and Hispanics, thereby refusing to
vacate a half-black, half-Hispanic defendant's conviction where the prosecution may
have attempted to systematically exclude those groups in use of peremptories), vacated,
110 S. Ct. 2995 (1990), remanded to 923 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1991); Roman v. Abrams, 822
F.2d 214, 229 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1052 (1989) (holding that even where
prosecution could not rebut evidence of exclusion by use of peremptories, the petit jury
was fairly representative and therefore no violation occurred).
However, the Supreme Court rejected this interesting approach when it vacated Al-
varado, holding that decision to be inconsistent with the Court's decision in Holland v.
Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 (1990) (in which the Supreme Court refused to extend the Sixth
Amendment fair cross-section right to the petit jury, instead limiting it to the broader
jury selection process).
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process.4
11. UNITED STATES V. GELB
A. Jury Selection and the District Court Opinion
In Gelb the defendant, a deeply religious Jewish person,
challenged his 1988 mail fraud, RICO, bribery, and false income
tax filing convictions, alleging discriminatory jury selection pro-
cedures.4" Central to Gelb's appeal were several pretrial proce-
dural rulings concerning jury selection procedures that he
claimed improperly denied him his Sixth Amendment right to a
fair cross-section of his community as articulated by the Su-
preme Court in Duren."'
Thirteen days before his trial date, Gelb petitioned the dis-
trict court for a postponement until the week of October
11th-one week after the holiday of Simchas TorahO--based on
the concern that the jury pool would not contain a proportionate
number of potential jurors of Jewish faith, thereby denying him
his guarantee of a venire reflecting a fair cross-section of the
community.51 In support of his claim Gelb offered evidence sug-
"7Duren, 439 U.S. at 364. Subsequent Supreme Court Sixth Amendment decisions
have recognized the fair cross-section guarantee created by the Duren and Taylor deci-
sions. See, e.g., Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 292 (1989) (defendant's equal protection
claim that prosecutor misused peremptries in violation of Batson was procedurally
barred since defendant's conviction was final before Batson was decided); Lockhart v.
McGee, 476 U.S. 162, 173-75 (1986) (trial court did not violate defendant's Sixth or
Fourteenth Amendment rights by ruling to excuse prospective jurors, prior to the guilt
phase of a bifurcated trial, who admitted at voir dire that they could never vote to im-
pose the death penalty); Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 461 (1985) (whether a pro-
spective juror will automatically vote against the death penalty and thereby be subjected
to dismissal from service is a fact question for the trial judge). Howiever, the Supreme
Court has not yet addressed any religion-based exclusionary challenges under the Duren
test.
', Gelb, 881 F.2d at 1157.
49 Gelb also challenged the application of the RICO statute, the application of the
mail fraud statute and the district court's failure to declare a mistrial in response to the
improper testimony of a witness. Id.
50 Simchas Torah is a one-day festive holiday during which men parade in celebra-
tion of the Torah-the precious scripture of Jewish law.
"1 Brief for Appellant at 1, United States v. Gelb, 881 F.2d 1155 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 994 (1989).
In Gelb the defendant was a member of the allegedly underrepresented group
(Jews). However, the Supreme Court has read the fair cros-section guarantee broadly,
allowing defendants to challenge the systematic exclusion of any cognizable group, in-
cluding groups other than their own. Holland, 493 U.S. at 776 (white defendant has
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gesting that "Jews called to serve jury duty in September and
October 1988 'would be routinely excused from jury duty . . .
simply by writing to the Jury Administrator.' "52 The govern-
ment answered by offering evidence that Jewish people were ex-
cluded only on specific days and not during the entire holiday
season.
53
The district court judge, in denying the motion, stated, "I
have never felt the Jewish people are a cognizable racial group,
different from the majorities of the rest of the whites in the
United States."5 Yet in spite of this ruling and the district
court's posture on "Jewishness," the trial was ultimately
delayed, and the defendant continued to press the issue of jury
selection procedures. 5
standing to challenge the exclusion of black jurors); Duren, 439 U.S. at 353 (male de-
fendant had standing to challenge the exclusion of women); Taylor, 419 U.S. at 526
(same); Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 500 (1972) ("the exclusion of a discernible class from
jury service injures not only those defendants who belong to the excluded class but other
defendants as well in that it destroys the possibility that the jury will reflect a represen-
tative cross-section of the community"). The Peters Court recognized that a minority of
state courts and lower federal courts have imposed a more restrictive "same class" rule
with regard to discriminatory jury selection claims. Peters, 407 U.S. at 496-97 n.4.
52 Gelb, 881 F.2d at 1159 (quoting Gelb's wife's affidavit). The defendant's evidence
was an affidavit submitted by his wife averring that someone at the Clerk's Office of the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York had informed her of
this practice. The identity of this clerk remains a mystery [and is sarcastically character-
ized by the government in opposition to defendant's motion as "an anonymous function-
ary."] Brief for Appellee at 24, 881 F.2d at 1155.
03 The government offered an affirmation by the United States Attorney for the
Eastern District of New York which stated that, according to Aileen O'Hare, a Jury
Clerk for the Eastern District, excuses were granted only for the specific dates of the
holidays. Gelb, 881 F.2d at 1159-60.
Gelb, 881 F.2d at 1160. This poorly expressed characterization was at the heart of
defense counsels' rage in its briefs to the Second Circuit-as evidenced by their strident
argument that "the reasons for the absence of all Jewish jurors were ... directly attribu-
table to Judge Van Sickle's complete insensitivity to Gelb's religious convictions and the
court's utter lack of familiarity with Judaism." Brief for Appellant at 14. Judge Van
Sickle from the District Court of North Dakota sat by designation over the proceedings
after Judge Platt decided-for reasons not fully disclosed by the record-not to continue
as trial judge. Id. at 13. The switch to Judge Van Sickle was deeply disturbing to the
defense, who felt that Van Sickle's conduct regarding Gelb's religious convictions was
"destructive.' Id. at 14.
"5 Brief for Appellant at 14-15. The denial of the motion to postpone trial was not
contested by the defense in their argument to the Second Circuit. Specifically, Gelb ar-
gued to the Second Circuit that as a result of the judge's misconception, the judge subse-
quently failed to make any religion-related inquiries on voir dire and that this view fore.
closed any meaningful inquiry into the Eastern District's possible practice of deferring
Jewish individuals called for service during the Jewish holidays. Id. at 15.
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Five days before his August 22nd trial date was to com-
mence the defendant entered a hospital for a surgical proce-
dure.56 Defendant's motion for a twelve-week postponement in
order to recover was denied, and the trial date was set for Sep-
tember-one week before the Jewish holiday of Rosh
Hashana-giving the defendant approximately one month to re-
cover. 57 The defendant, still concerned with Jewish representa-
tion in the jury pool, again requested an adjournment to "insure
the availability of prospective Jewish jurors in numbers which
[bear] a proportionate relationship to the population of Jews in
the counties from which the Eastern District draws its jurors."' 8
The district court again denied defendant's motion and un-
dertook the process of empaneling a petit jury. At voir dire, con-
ducted by the bench, there was no inquiry into the religious or
ethnic background of the prospective jurors, nor was there any
formal request by defense counsel for such an inquiry."" A jury
was quickly empaneled, and after a six-week trial the defendant
was convicted of violating the RICO Act, the federal mail fraud
statute, the federal bribery statute and the Internal Revenue
Code. 0
Brief for Appellee at 21. The government claimed that the defendant's gallstone
removal was a tactic to delay the proceedings and was not an actual emergency. Id. at 21
n.5. In fact it was termed "elective" by the Second Circuit. Gelb, 81 F.2d at 1160. For a
discussion of whether defendant's conduct constituted a waiver of his cross-section right,
estopping him from raising a fair cross-section challenge, see note 116 infra.
17 Brief for Appellant at 14. A two-day holiday, Roash Hashana is the start of the
Jewish New Year. Rosh Hashana is literally translated as "head of the year." E.
GA ORA, Hsum's HAPPY HOLIDAY 28 (1953).
" Brief for Appellant at 1. The defendant produced statistical evidence from the
most recent state census of the principal New York counties from which jurors are se-
lected in the Eastern District-Kings County, Queens County and Nnaau County. Ac-
cording to the census, the population of Jewish persons was 19%, 17% and 23%, respec-
tively. Id. at 25 n.9.
9 Gelb, 881 F.2d at 1160. It is this Comment's position that an inquiry into the
religious or ethnic background of prospective jurors in some form may ultimately be
necessary to ensure the defendant's right to a fair cross-section. For a general discussion
of the policy arguments for and against the making of such an inquiry, see note 126
infra. See also notes 129-32 and accompanying text infra discussing whether Gelb waived
his claim by not formally asking Judge Van Sickle to inquire into the religious or ethnic
affiliations of his venire persons.
60 881 F.2d at 1155. Neither the district court nor the Second Circuit explicitly indi-
cated whether the petit jury or the venire that convicted the defendant contained any
Jewish people. However, it is not disputed by the appellee anywhere in the record that
there were no Jewish people on the defendant's petit jury. Appellant's Petition for Re-
hearing and for In Banc Consideration at 5 n.3. See notes 7 and 46 and accompanying
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B. The Second Circuit Decision
Gelb argued before the Second Circuit that the district
court erred by denying his motion for a brief adjournment,
claiming that this denial ensured the unavailability of prospec-
tive Jewish jurors in numbers proportional to the population of
Jews in the Eastern District."1 Gelb also argued that due to the
district court's adverse characterization of the cognizability of
Jews, the court wrongfully failed to inquire into the religious af-
filiations of prospective jurors.6 2
At the outset of its opinion the court proceeded under the
fair cross-section principle espoused in Taylor v. Louisiana, not-
ing that the Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury "unques-
tionably includes the right to a petit jury drawn from a pool that
is a representative cross-section of the community."6 3 However,
the court rejected Gelb's claim that the district court unconsti-
tutionally deprived him of a pool of potential jurors representa-
tive of his community by not postponing his trial until after the
Jewish holiday season.6 4
The court succinctly distinguished Gelb from the Supreme
Court's decision in Batson v. Kentucky. 5 In doing so, the Sec-
ond Circuit recognized that Batson involved prosecutorial mis-
conduct in the exercise of peremptory challenges, while Gelb was
concerned with the effects of judicial rulings and inherent sys-
tematic intrusions on the makeup of both the jury pool and the
defendant's venire6s The court focused its analysis instead on
text supra examining the relationship between the fair cross-section and the petit jury's
actual composition.
11 Brief for Appellant at 1.
'r Id. at 1-2. The Second Circuit opinion ignores this claim. Moreover, it seems the
Second Circuit believed that the district court's remark was during trial, when it actually
was made during pretrial motions. Defendant contended that it was this pretrial charac-
terization that shaped the district court's negative attitude towards "Jewishness" and
prevented inquiry into prospective jurors' beliefs at this stage in the jury selection pro-
cess. Appellants Petition for Rehearing and For In Banc Consideration at 4. See text
accompanying notes 117-19 infra discussing the court's failure to consider this issue.
63 Gelb, 881 F.2d at 1161 (citing Taylor, 419 U.S. at 528). Technically, the court
misstated Taylor here. The fair cross-section requirement guarantees that the jury pool
be drawn in a nondiscriminatory manner-not that the pool be a representative cross-
section.
64 Id.
:5 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
6 Gelb, 881 F.2d at 1161. This Comment resists the temptation to invent a strong
connection between Batson and Gelb where one does not logically exist. While both may
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the three-prong standard set forth in Duren v. Missouri, which
lists the elements that a defendant must meet to establish a
prima facie violation of the fair cross-section protection.6 7 In ap-
plying this standard, the court held that in order to be success-
ful Gelb needed to demonstrate: (1) that the Jewish community
is a "distinctive group" in the community;6 8 (2) that the repre-
sentation of Jews in venires drawn in the Eastern District of
New York is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of
such persons in the community;6e and (3) that this under-
lead to an unfair cross-section on the petit jury, the route to the discriminatory practice
varies considerably. Put simply, Batson involves discriminatory practices by the prosecu-
tion in trying to shape the petit jury after the venire has been empaneled, while Gelb
focuses on an exclusionary practice that denied a defendant an opportunity for a repre-
sentative venire before the venire was empaneled.
Id. See text accompanying notes 14 and 47 supra.
" The words "cognizable," "distinctive" and "identifiable" are used seemingly inter-
changeably when describing this element. However, there is no single formulation for
what is considered a cognizable group. A cognizable group has been defined by the Su-
preme Court as "a recognizable, distinct class, singled out for different treatment under
the laws, as written or as applied." Castenada v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482,494 (1971) (Court
found 40% disparity between Mexican-American population and Mexican-American
grad jury figures for an 11-year period to be sufficient prima facie showing of inten-
tional discrimination in grand jury selection). Similarly, the Court has described
cognizability in terms of whether a group has been singled out "for different treatment
not based on some reasonable classification." Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 60 (1961)
(citing Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478 (1954) (Court upheld a Florida statute
exempting women from service unless they volunteered). The Court has also held that a
group is legally cognizable if it displays distinctive "qualities of human nature and vari-
eties of human experience" or a unique perspective on events. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S.
493, 503-04 (1972). Historical discrimination is a factor, and groups identified as "dis-
crete and insular minorities" will be recognized as distinctive. United State3 v. Carolene
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (where in upholding Congres's right to regu-
late the shipment of milk products in interstate commerce, the Court indicated that for
statutes directed at particular religious, national or racial minorities, a more searching
judicial inquiry may be necessary than that undertaken when reviewing economic legisla-
tion in order to protect those groups' position in the political prooess).
See also JutywoRK, supra note 4, at 5.05[1] to 5.05[2] (discuesing different formula-
tions of what constitutes a cognizable group and an analysis of the legal cognizability of
various groups); Project: Nineteenth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United
States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1988-1989, 78 Gso. LJ. 1107, 1110 n.1917
(1990) (weighing the cognizability and noncognizability of various groups, including
whites (held to be cognizable in Roman, 822 F.2d 214, 228 (2d Cir. 1987)) [hereinafter
Project]; Rossenson, Note: Wainwright v. Witt. The Court Casts a False Light Bach-
ward, 66 B.U.L Rav. 311, 314 (1985) (finding a group distinct under the Sixth Amend-
ment if the group is limited by some factor, the group has similarities in attitude or
experience, and has interests that cannot be properly represented if excluded from the
jury selection process).
69 As to what constitutes a "fair and reasonable" relation, no specific parameters
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representation was due to the systematic exclusion of the group
by the jury selection process.70
The Second Circuit acknowledged that the district court
was wrong to conclude that Jews are not their own distinctive
group in the community; yet it also concluded that it was at the
second prong of Duren where Gelb's argument failed.7 1 The
court posited that Gelb did not adequately demonstrate that
Jews were underrepresented in his venire, refusing to credit de-
fendant's claim that "virtually none of the [potential jurors']
surnames carried any suggestion of being Jewish. 7 2 The court
reasoned that "stereotypical ethnic or religious characterizations
of surnames are unreliable and only tenuous indicia of the jury's
makeup"7 and supported its position by referring to opinions of
the First Circuit.7 4 The court added that underrepresentation
cannot be presumed absent a specific correlation between being
Jewish and having a Jewish surname, again buttressing its posi-
exist. Duren held that women are underrepresented when they constitute 54% of the
community but only 15% of venires. Duren, 439 U.S. at 364-66. The Duren Court ac-
cepted six-year-old census data as adequate proof of the percentage of eligible jurors who
were women. Id. at 365 n.24. Most circuits look at the "absolute disparity" of the group
reflected, measured by the difference between the percent of the group eligible for jury
duty and the percent on the venire. Project, supra note 68, at 1110 n.1917, However,
since eligible juror data is often unavailable, courts generally accept overall population
data as a substitute. See, e.g., People v. Harris, 36 Cal. 3d 36, 51-58, 679 P.2d 433, 441-
45, 201 Cal. Rptr. 782, 790-94 (1984).
Some courts have set the deviation figure at 10% for what is to be considered signifi-
cant underrepresentation. See, e.g., Singleton v. Lockhart, 871 F.2d 1395, 1398 (8th Cir.
1989) (finding the underrepresentation of blacks on the venire to be fair and reasonable
when representation was within 3.6% of the population in the community from which
the potential jurors were selected), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 207 (1989); United States v.
Rodriguez, 776 F.2d 1509, 1511-12 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that the absolute disparity
of 6.67% for Blacks and 5.52% for Hispanics did not establish a prima facie case of
significant underrepresentation).
70 To satisfy this element, a defendant must be able to point to a particular feature
of the jury selection system that produced the underrepresentation. See, e.g., Duren, 439
U.S. at 366 (petitioner showed that underrepresentation of women occurred upon the
creation of the jury wheel from which persons were summoned).
11 Gelb, 881 F.2d at 1160-61 (citing Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S.
615 (1987)) (finding Jews to be a distinctive racial group for the purposes of raising a 42
U.S.C. § 1982 civil rights claim).
71 Gelb, 881 F.2d at 1161.
7 Id. at 1161-62.
7' Id. at 1162 (citing United States v. Bucci, 839 F.2d 825 (1st Cir. 1988), cert. de-
nied, 488 U.S. 844 (1988); United States v. Sgro, 816 F.2d 30 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 1063 (1988). See text accompanying notes 86-93 infra discussing these cases.
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tion with a First Circuit cite.7 5 Hence, finding that Gelb did not
satisfy the second prong of Duren, the court declined to address
whether Jewish individuals were systematically excluded from
the jury process."6
Additionally, the Second Circuit ignored Gelb's plea that
the district court unconstitutionally refused to explore the reli-
gious identities of Gelb's venire persons,7 because of the district
court's incorrect conception regarding Jewish cognizability. 5
The Second Circuit also refused to address whether the district
court's view adversely affected Gelb's ability to show whether
Jews were underrepresented on his venire; the court held simply
that no such showing had been made. 9
III. ANALYSIS
The Second Circuit's decision in Gelb is problematic in that
it matter-of-factly rejects the defendant's Jewish surname argu-
ment as unreliable. The court fails to consider that relying on
the absence of surnames may be the only way defendants can
show the underrepresentation of a particular religious or ethnic
group on the defendant's venire or the total jury pool. Addition-
ally, the court's opinion fails to address whether exploring the
religious or ethnic affiliations of venire members may ultimately
be necessary to insure a defendant's constitutional fair cross-sec-
tion guarantee; the court thereby creates the potential for une-
qual application of the guarantee among criminal defendants.80
By resting its decision on Gelb's failure to demonstrate under-
representation rather than focusing on the more probative ques-
tion of systematic exclusion, the Second Circuit undermined the
constitutional fair cross-section requirement.
7 Id. at 1162 (citing Bucci, 839 F.2d at 834). See text accompanying notes 96-103
infra discussing how Bucci relates to Gelb.
76 Gelb, 881 F.2d at 1162. See text accompanying notes 139-46 infra discussing why
the court should have rested its decision on the third prong of the Duren te3t.
See Brief for Appellant at 1-2, 14.
78 See note 54 and accompanying text supra.
71 Gelb, 881 F.2d at 1161.
" See note 138 and accompanying text infra.
1991]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
A. Failure to Demonstrate Underrepresentation: The Second
Circuit's Troubling Analysis
1. The Surname Argument
As prima facie evidence that Jews were underrepresented in
both his venire and the jury pool in a manner not fair and rea-
sonable in relation to the number of such persons in the commu-
nity, Gelb contended that "[v]irtually none of the [potential ju-
rors] surnames carried any suggestion of being Jewish." 8
Essentially Gelb's claim was that it did not even sound like
there were any Jewish people in his venire; he thus inferred that
Jewish people were significantly underrepresented in his venire.
The Second Circuit dismissed this evidence as stereotypical in
nature, finding it unreliable as to whether Jews were in fact un-
derrepresented on Gelb's venire . 2 Based on this position, the
court held that Gelb did not adequately demonstrate that his
venire lacked proper Jewish representation, and therefore Gelb
failed to satisfy the second prong of the Duren standard.8 3 To
buttress this rejection of Gelb's Jewish surname argument, the
court turned to two decisions of the First Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, United States v. Sgro84 and United States v. Bucci 1
In Sgro the First Circuit rejected a challenge by the appel-
lant, an Italian-American, that by peremptorily challenging "the
only two Italian-surnamed jurors on the venire," and thus at-
tempting on impermissible grounds to exclude a cognizable
group in the community of which the defendant was a member,
the government violated the Batson test.86 For a defendant to
make a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination by the
prosecution under this test, the defendant must be a member of
a cognizable racial group, and the prosecutor must have peremp-
torily removed members of the defendant's race from the ve-
61 Gelb, 881 F.2d at 1161.
Id. at 1161-62. See text accompanying notes 72-75 supra.
" 881 F.2d at 1162.
816 F.2d 30 (1st Cir. 1988).
839 F.2d 825 (1st Cir. 1988).
816 F.2d at 32. The First Circuit sought to reinforce its position by questioning
whether defendant's name, which ended in a vowel, immediately suggests an Italian heri-
tage. Sgro, 816 F.2d at 33 n.2 ("The unsatisfactory vagueness of the record is highlighted
by the fact that there is nothing which in any way indicates that appellant-defendant's
name, Sgro, hardly one in common usage, is 'Italian-American'.").
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nire.8 7 The defendant can assume that the exercising of per-
emptories is a practice providing "'the opportunity for
discrimination.' "88 Lastly, the defendant must show that these
facts and other relevant circumstances raise an inference that
the prosecutor used the practice to exclude the venire persons
based on their race."" The First Circuit held that "conclusory
allegations" regarding jurors' surnames were insufficient to meet
the burden of cognizability and therefore failed the Batson
test."0
In Bucci the First Circuit found appellant's claim that the
government's use of peremptory challenges violated the Sixth
Amendment to be "based on pure conjecture."9 ' That court pos-
ited that those challenging the government's use of peremptories
must offer evidence of "the ethnic or racial composition of the
community from which the jurors are drawn and of what sur-
name endings indicate about that ethnic or racial composi-
tion. 91 2 The court held that "there was no evidence presented
from which it could be found that persons whose surname ends
[sic] in a vowel are Italian-Americans. 9 5 Hence, Bucci fore-
closed defendants from offering juror surnames as evidence of
Italian ethnicity.
While at first glance the Gelb court's quick disposal of the
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 93 (1986). This test differed from the Duren test
in that a defendant raising a fair cross-section challenge under Duren need not be a
member of a cognizable group, nor a member of the excluded group. However, the Su-
preme Court has recently held that a defendant need not be a member of the excluded
group to challenge the discriminatory removal of potential jurors. Powers v. Ohio, 111 S.
Ct. 1364 (1991) (white defendant could assert a Batson violation where prosecutor im-
properly used peremptory challenges to eliminate potential black jurors). See note 51
supra discussing standing.
" 476 U.S. at 95 (quoting Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 552 (1967)).
89 Id. at 95-96.
-- Sgro, 816 F.2d at 33.
91 Bucci, 839 F.2d at 834. See note 12 supra regarding the applicability of the Sixth
Amendment to discriminatory use of peremptory challenges by the prosecution.
92 Id. As in Sgro, the defendant in Bucci was an Italian-American who challenged
the government's use of peremptories against jurors whose last names ended in a vowel
Id. at 832.
93 Id. at 834. It is hard to imagine what sort of evidence the court was seeking. Even
if counsel proffered positive studies showing a correlation between last name3 ending in
vowels and Italian ethnicity, the only way to show that these conclusions were necssa-
rily applicable to the defendant's venire would have been to ask the jurors if they were
Italian-American. In essence, since there were no statistics regarding particular ethnic or
religious groups on the venire, the only way to have determined conclusively if the ex-
cluded jurors were of Italian descent would have been to ask them.
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surname issue appears both legally principled and morally
sound, since it does not allow constitutional challenges to be
made using stereotypes that might otherwise be offensive, a
more probing inquiry reveals that the court improvidently relied
on Sgro and Bucci. Sgro essentially held that a defendant can-
not satisfy the burden of proving cognizability absent a showing
of the nexus between surnames and ethnicity.94 Since Gelb did
not proffer the surname argument to establish cognizability,
having easily satisfied that part of the Duren standard, Sgro is
inapposite and of little use in determining Gelb's fate.90
Moreover, the court overlooked a position within its own
circuit raised by United States u. Biaggi9" that directly contra-
dicts Bucci regarding the inferences to be drawn from surnames
of jurors in relation to the ethnicity of those jurors. Had the Sec-
ond Circuit considered the Biaggi reasoning, Gelb's constitu-
tional challenge would have received a more thoughtful and
principled disposition.97 Specifically, the surname krgument
raised by Gelb ultimately may have necessitated a factual deter-
mination of whether members of the °Jewish community were
underrepresented in his venire.95
In Biaggi the Second Circuit affirmed a district court opin-
ions9 that the defendant, an Italian-American, made out a prima
facie case of impermissible discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges where the government used its first five peremptories
to exclude venire members whose surnames ended in vowels.100
The Second Circuit in Biaggi noted the district court's observa-
tion that "Americans of Italian descent .. .often have com-
monly identifiable surnames ."101 The court implicitly ac-
Sgro, 816 F.2d at 33.
" See text accompanying note 71 supra.
" 853 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1052 (1989).
*' The absence of Biaggi in the Second Circuit opinion was likely the product of
judicial oversight, since both the defense (Brief for Appellant at 27) and the prosecution
(Brief for Appellee at 23) cited to it.
" See text accompanying notes 124-32 infra for a discussion of the necessity of such
a determination.
" United States v. Biaggi, 673 F. Supp. 96 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
100 Biaggi, 853 F.2d at 95-96. The prosecution challenged Joseph Angerome, Frand
Lauriciano, Andrew Baccarella, Patricia Randazzo and Louis Devito. Biaggi, 673 F.
Supp. at 97. The Second Circuit also upheld the district court's finding that the prosecu-
tion's race-neutral explanations were adequate, ultimately dismissing defendant's chal-
lenge. Biaggi, 853 F.2d at 96.
1*1 Biaggi, 853 F.2d at 96.
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cepted the district court's findings that "Italian-Americans'
shared ancestry is easily visible in their Italian surnames"'' 2 and
that "[t]hese observable, distinguishable names constitute a
clearly identifiable factor separating Italian-Americans from
most other ethnic groups." 10 3 In effect, unlike the analogous
Bucci decision, the Second Circuit in Biaggi held that Italian
defendants could use the surnames of prospective jurors as evi-
dence of the Italian ethnicity of those jurors so as to raise an
inference that the prosecutor intentionally sought to exclude
Italians from the petit jury.
Gelb's use of the surname argument was not raised in the
context of a prosecutor using peremptories to exclude prospec-
tive jurors.0 Rather, Gelb posited the surname argument in or-
der to demonstrate that Jews were significantly under-
represented on the venire empaneled prior to voir dire. e03 In
102 Biaggi, 673 F. Supp. at 102. Such a position has received support from the Su-
preme Court. The Court has recognized that Mexican ancestry may be apparent from
surnames. Castaneda v. Particle, 430 U.S. 482,495 (1977) (relying on the absence of Mex-
ican surnames in jury pools over an li-year period, the Court found that the defendant
had made a prima facie showing of discrimination in the selection of grand jurofs).
103 Id. at 100. The court expressly rejected the Sgro court's conclusion on the
cognizability of Italian-Americans and found them to be a legally cognizable group. Id. at
100-02.
104 Biaggi, 853 F.2d at 92. The real question is whether a defendant's claim that the
surnames of his venire panel left no suggestion of Jewish ethnicity can on some level be
analogized to Italian defendants' claims that jurors whose last names end in vowels are
Italians against whom the prosecution is discriminating. This Comment argues that for
purposes of the second element of Duren, this analogy is appropriate.
105 Had the prosecutor in Gelb challenged ten people with last names ending in -
katz, -itz, -berg or -feld-stereotypically Jewish-it is possible under the Biaggi rationale
that the prosecutor would be forced to offer religion or ethnicity-neutral explanations
under Batson. Thus, the absence of such names from the venire should also be recog-
nized as evidence that this community was underrepresented on Gelb's venire.
This Comment recognizes the government's argument that of course many Jewish
persons have surnames that do not "carry any suggestion of their religion" and that
"some persons who are not born Jewish can choose to become Jewish later in life." Brief
for Appellee at 24-25. However, despite these arguments, this Comment posits that
where a defendant can demonstrate that a group has been systematically excluded from
jury service, the significantly underrepresented prong of the Duren test can be presumed
satisfied. For example, had Gelb produced evidence that within the last two years 150
people randomly selected by the jury commisioner each year were granted postpone-
ments during this three-week period (what Gelb deemed the "Jewish holiday season"),
these people would have been absent from the total jury pool. If the court found these
postponements were an unjustifiable practice of systematically excluding potential Jew-
ish jurors from the pool from which Gelb's venire was ultimately chosen, then it would
be proper for the court to conclude that the defendant had shown significant under-
representation (Le., a few postponements would not give rise to a finding of "systematic"
1991]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
rejecting this "evidence" in Gelb, the court contended that
judges cannot automatically presume underrepresentation every
time a defendant claims that the surnames of the venire mem-
bers suggest some groups' underrepresentation.Yos In essence, the
court refused to extend Biaggi's surname principle, which would
allow a defendant to satisfy inferentially the prima facie burden
of whether a particular religious or ethnic group was signifi-
cantly underrepresented on the venire from which the jurors
were selected. The Second Circuit's underlying position was that
even if this extension has conceptual appeal,107 it gives defend-
ants a constitutional windfall to which they are not entitled. 108
However, by adopting the Bucci/Sgro rationale that the sur-
names of prospective jurors alone do not, as a matter of law,
indicate the ethnic or religious composition of the jurors, the
Gelb court unjustly ignored the Biaggi decision and failed to
consider the burden facing defendants in individual circum-
stances.109 A defendant should not need to produce a linguistics
exclusion), this despite the presence of people on defendant's venire who were in fact
Jewish despite having non-Jewish surnames. Essentially, where a defendant demon-
strates systematic exclusion of a particular group, a Duren challenge should not be re-
jected for lack of a mechanism to prove affirmatively that groups' significant under-
representation. A defendant should be able to develop the element of
underrepresentation by the use of surnames and the subsequent showing of systematic
exclusion.
106 Gelb, 881 F.2d at 1162.
107 Since the court presumes invidious discrimination when the government excludes
people from jury service based on surnames, it would be convenient to presume under-
representation if the venire is generally without certain surnames. See note 105 supra
discussing a potential flaw in the above argument.
108 For example, had the Gelb court presumed underrepresentation of Jews in a
fifty-person venire based on the surname theory, yet ten members were in fact Jewish,
Gelb would not have actually been denied his fair cross-section requirement since Jews
would not have been significantly underrepresented (20% of the community, 20% of the
venire). Yet had Gelb somehow been able to show the court that there was evidence of
systematic exclusion, he might have been able to get a new trial. However, since demon-
strating a practice of systematic exclusion is likely to lead to a showing of significant
underrepresentation, those instances where defendants could conceivably receive a wind-
fall are not significant enough to undermine this Comment's position on how a defendant
is to satisfy the second element of the Duren inquiry.
109 For example, had Gelb's surname argument proved true and there were in fact
no Jewish people on his venire, Gelb would have made a prima facie showing of signifi-
cant underrepresentation for purposes of Duren. Yet Bucci and Sgro do not give the
defendant the benefit of the surname doubt in trying to make this argument. The court's
adoption of the First Circuit's inflexible and unjust rationale creates the need for a more
appropriate balance in weighing a defendant's fundamental guarantee. See notes 115 and
126 infra discussing how this Comment seeks to strike the balance.
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expert to make a prima facie case that a cognizable group has
been significantly underrepresented. 110 Rather, the court should
evaluate the legitimacy of the argument against the backdrop of
the entire Duren challenge."' When the defendant has made a
strong showing of lack of surnames and when the cognizable and
systematic exclusion elements have been satisfied under Duren,
the court should presume that the element of significant under-
representation has been shown and that a prima facie Duren vi-
olation has been established.
Therefore, the Second Circuit in Gelb erred by discarding
the defendant's surname argument. By rejecting the use of sur-
names as a potential indicator of a venire's religious or ethnic
composition, the Gelb decision created a virtually insurmounta-
ble burden for defendants seeking to show significant under-
representation under Duren. 1 2 The Gelb court failed to see that,
with the satisfaction of the other Duren elements, the lack of
certain surnames must be accepted in order to fully guarantee
the fair cross-section requirement; it may be the only method of
proof available to the defendant trying to show the significant
110 A defendant's position will be much stronger if an expert like an anthropologist
or other "names" expert testifies that the list of names in the venire or the jury pool
indicate the significant underrepresentation of the particular group. Under this scenario
a defendant can certainly be considered to have made a prima facie showing to satisfy
that element of Duren. See Biaggi, 637 F. Supp. at 100 (defendant alerted the district
court that, in the opinion of linguistics experts, the last names of the struck jurors were
clearly Italian-American).
Il Since the Supreme Court limits the fair cross-section principle to cognizable
groups only, the underrepresentation of many groups would not be actionable. The first
element threshold would not be met and therefore inquiries into the second element
would be unnecessary. Reply Brief for Appellant at 5 n.2, Gelb, 881 F.2d 1155. See
Biaggi, 673 F.2d at 100 (The court recognized the need for limits on this element: "Be-
cause discrimination in the venire under the Sixth Amendment may be statistical, the
definition of a single 'cognizable' group must be narrowly drawn le3t any group imagin-
able by defense counsel be found numerically underrepresented."). See also Barber v.
Ponte, 772 F.2d 982, 999 (1st Cir. 1985) (in banc) (where the court endorsed limiting this
element, warning that blue-collar workers, yuppies, Rotarians, Eagle Scouts and endless
other classifications could receive protection), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1050 (1986); see note
68 supra discussing the various definitions for what makes a group cognizable.
Additionally, the court could treat the third element, systematic exclusion, before
deciding the question of significant underrepresentation. Thus, only if the court is con-
vinced that there is demonstrable systematic exclusion would it pozsibly need to enter
the sensitive area of asking jurors about their religious or ethnic affiliations. See note 113
infra discussing this inquiry.
1 See text accompanying notes 117-32 infra discussing the "failure to inquire"
argument.
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underrepresentation of a cognizable group.
If the court is unwilling to accept the claimed lack of appro-
priate surnames on the venire, in conjunction with a showing of
a group's systematic exclusion, as evidence of that group's signif-
icant underrepresentation, defendants may never be able to sat-
isfy the second prong of Duren. At a minimum, the court must
treat the surname argument as a motion to inquire into the reli-
gious or ethnic backgrounds of venire persons-an invasion that
district courts are extremely reluctant to make.'13 Despite the
intrusion upon potential jurors, when the defendant's Sixth
Amendment constitutional rights will be bypassed in the ab-
sence of an investigation, district courts must investigate the re-
ligious or ethnic affinity of venire members to see if the allegedly
underrepresented group is in fact unfairly underrepresented. 114
In short, where the defendant can make a prima facie showing of
the systematic exclusion of a cognizable group, and there exists
no other mechanism for a defendant to demonstrate significant
underrepresentation," 5 the district court's broad discretion must
"1 The general presumption is that there is something egregious about asking po-
tential jurors about their religious or ethnic affiliations. See, e.g., United States v.
Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 141 (2d Cir. 1979) ("As to religion, our jury system was not
designed to subject prospective jurors to a catechism of their tenets of faith, whether it
be Catholic, Jewish, Protestant, Mohammeden, or to force them to publicly declare
themselves to be atheists."), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 907 (1980). This is further evidenced
by jury questionnaire forms which often provide no space for jurors to indicate their
religious, ethnic or racial affiliations. See, e.g., N.Y. JUD. LAW § 513 (Consol. Supp. 1989)
(the jury questionnaire mailed to prospective jurors in New York).
"' See Comment, Voir Dire Limitations as a Means of Protecting Juror's Safety
and Privacy: United States v. Barnes, 93 HARv. L. REV. 782, 783, 791 (1980) (recognizing
that where the defendant can demonstrate that he or she will be precluded from ob-
taining an impartial jury, the need to investigate potential jurors' religious and ethnic
backgrounds may outweigh the possible harm of such an investigation).
Trial courts in both state and federal courts have made this investigation in assess-
ing the legitimacy of a defendant's claim that the prosecutor has invidiously discrimi-
nated in its use of peremptories. See, e.g., Biaggi, 673 F. Supp. at 98 (court asked jurors
upon discharge whether they had Italian relations to assess defense counsel's argument
of invidious use of peremptories by the prosecution); People v. Kagan, 101 Misc. 2d 274,
420 N.Y.S.2d 987 (Sup. Ct. 1979) (trial judge brought four excused jurors into chambers
to determine if they were Jewish after the defense claimed that the prosecutor sought to
exclude them based on their last names).
115 Courts could avoid the potential problem of having to inquire into the personal
lives of prospective jurors by accepting lack of certain surnames as prima facie evidence
of significant underrepresentation of a cognizable group, and thereby shift the analysis to
whether there is evidence of the systematic exclusion of that group. However, where a
surname analysis offers little in establishing a prima facie case of underrepresentaton,
courts may still be able to avoid intruding into the personal lives of jurors.
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defer to the defendant's fundamental fair cross-section right, ne-
cessitating an inquiry into the religious or ethnic affiliations of
the venire persons.116
2. Failure to Explore the Religious Affiliations of the
Venire in Gelb:
Another of Gelb's main arguments before the Second Cir-
cuit was that his constitutional right to a fair cross-section was
violated due to the district court's refusal to explore during voir
dire the religious affinities of the members of his venire.117 Gelb
attributed this refusal to the district court's erroneous character-
ization that "Jewish people are [not] a cognizable racial group
different from the majorities of the rest of whites in the United
States." ' It was Gelb's position that by asserting as a "thresh-
old matter that Jews did not constitute a 'cognizable racial
group,"' the court prevented him from demonstrating a fair
For example, surnames may be of no use in determining whether Baptists, Protes-
tants, or Catholics were significantly underrepresented in the venire from which the jury
was chosen. This does not automatically mean that upon request the trial court must
inquire as to the venire persons' religious or ethnic beliefs. Rather, only if the defendant
can establish a prima facie case that these groups were in some way being systematically
excluded must a district court inquire into the potential jurors' personal lives. This in-
quiry would be made to confirm whether there was in fact significant underrepresenta-
tion on the defendant's venire as a product of this prima facie showing of systematic
exclusion. See note 126 infra describing how, when the entire Duren challenge is evalu-
ated, inquiries into the religious or ethnic affiliations of venire persons will likely be
unnecessary.
116 However, there may be extreme policy reasons that weigh in favor of not inquir-
ing into the personal lives of potential jurors-even at the possible expense of a defend-
ant's rights. See United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d at 121, 140-41, 168 (2d Cir. 1979)
(where the trial court indicated sua sponte that the names and addresses of jurors would
be withheld from counsel to ensure the safety of jurors). The court in Gelb may not have
needed to make an inquiry nor accept defendant's surname theory for reasons outside
the confines of the Duren test. The defendant's trial was initially scheduled for August
22, 1988. However, due to the defendant's surgery five days before trial (see note 56 and
accompanying text supra), the trial was delayed. If the government'a stance was correct
and Gelb's surgery was an unnecessary procedure designed to delay the trial (Brief for
Appellee at 21 n.5), Gelb invited any fair cross-section violation and should have been
effectively estopped from claiming a constitutional violation that he manufactured. See
text accompanying notes 139-52 infra discussing why no inquiry into the jurors' religious
affiliations was necessary within the parameters of Duren since the defendant had not
established a prima facie case of systematic exclusion of potential Jewish jurors.
117 Brief for Appellant at 1-2.
I1s Gelb, 881 F.2d at 1160. The court did not technically refuse to explore the reli-
gious affiliations of the prospective jurors since defense counsel did not formally ask the
court to inquire. Id.
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cross-section deprivation. 119
The Second Circuit's treatment of this portion of Gelb's ap-
peal was flawed and insufficient. The Court did not indicate why
it was unnecessary to respond to this legitimately posed consti-
tutional challenge. By not giving Gelb's claims any genuine con-
sideration, the court evaded important issues regarding the fair
cross-section challenge. Consequently, the court missed a tre-
mendous opportunity to establish a functional cross-section
requirement.
The court's response was simply to acknowledge that Jews
are in fact a legally cognizable group, opting not to address the
impact the district court's characterization may have had on the
defendant's ability to prove a constitutional deprivation. 120 Ad-
ditionally, the Second Circuit wrongly concluded that the dis-
trict court judge's characterization occurred during trial and not
during pretrial motions concerning jury selection-a district
court error that led to debatably "fatal" consequences for the
defendant. 2 '
After acknowledging cognizability, the court dismissed ap-
pellant's claim for failure to demonstrate significant under-
representation of Jews on the venire, matter-of-factly rejecting
defendant's contention that the surnames of his venire persons
did not suggest a fairly representative venire.122 The court of-
fered no guidance on how the defendant was to make a prima
facie case of significant underrepresentation when faced with a
district court judge insensitive to a religion-based challenge. 2 3
119 Brief for Appellant at 26. Gelb argued that Judge Van Sickle's predisposition
towards Jewish people evinced an intent to disregard the problem of Jewish under-
representation on the venire, making it impossible to determine how many, if any, venire
members were Jewish. Id. at 25.
10 Gelb, 881 F.2d at 1161. Gelb's attorney continues to hammer this point in a post.
appellate motion to the Second Circuit. Appellant's Petition for Rehearing and for In
Banc Consideration at 4 ("Given Judge Van Sickle's definitive closing of the door on this
issue, it is a cruel, unfair and poorly-grounded result to conclude, as the panel decision
has, that Gelb failed to demonstrate underrepresentation of Jews in the venire... and
consequently failed the second prong of the Duren test.").
121 Id. at 4. However, since Gelb's claim ultimately fails elsewhere (see text accom-
panying notes 139-52 infra) this error by the Second Circuit is properly viewed as
"harmless." See FEm. R. CRm. P. 52(a) ("Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which
does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.").
12 Gelb, 881 F.2d at 1161-62.
121 See Brief for Appellant at 14-15 (describing Judge Van Sickle's remarks regard-
ing Judaism and the Jewish holidays). But see Brief for Appellee at 22 ("Judge Van
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More specifically, having held that Jews were in fact a legally
cognizable group and having rejected defendant's surname the-
ory, the court needed to decide if direct inquiry into the reli-
gious or ethnic affinities of venire members was nevertheless
constitutionally mandated.124 Pertinent to this question is
whether such an inquiry needs to be formally requested by de-
fendants125 and whether there exist compelling policy reasons
against a personal inquiry into each venire member's religious or
ethnic affiliation. 26
Sickle exercised great patience, permitting Gelb to halt the trial during each of the seven
trial days that Gelb observed the holidays.").
124 See text accompanying notes 133-38 infra describing the predicament defendants
raising religion or ethnicity-based fair cross-section challenges face if such an inquiry is
not in some instances constitutionally mandated.
'15 As indicated (see text accompanying note 113 supra), the court should treat the
surname argument, if not accepted on its own as a fulfillment of Duren's second prong,
as a motion to inquire into the religious beliefs of the jurors, dispensing with the need for
a formal request by the defendant However, the Gelb opinion implicitly suggests that
the defendant's failure to petition the court to inquire into the religious belief of pro-
spective jurors was in fact fatal to defendant's claim.
128 Quite predictably, the government argued that such an inquiry would wreak pub-
lic policy havoc
The policy implications of Gelb's position are equally awkward. First, it is
ridiculous to suggest that judges must inquire into a potential juror's religious
beliefs or that juries must be composed of representative numbers of Baptists,
Buddhists, and Bahais .... Taken to its logical conclusion, Gelb's argument
would make it virtually impossible to schedule a trial in a district as relig-
iously, racially and ethnically diverse as the Eastern District of New York.
Brief for Appellee at 25 n.6.
The government's position opposing an inquiry into each venire person's ethnicity or
religious beliefs would have tremendous merit if district court judges were automatically
required to make this inquiry upon request from the defendant. This Comment rejects
that position, claiming rather that such an inquiry is only to be made when the defend-
ant can show a group to be cognizable (which may prevent an inquiry at the outset),
when the court rejects the absence of appropriate-sounding surnames as prima facie evi-
dence of significant underrepresentation, and when the defendant brings forth prima fa-
cie evidence that a group has been systematically excluded from service. In e.sence, in-
quiries are to be made as a last resort in Duren challenges. See note 115 supra.
The defendant, not to be outdone on the not-even-considered question of policy,
contended that the government's slippery slope argument was exaggerated.
The fact that Jews are only one of very few groups which the Supreme
Court has declared as a "distinctive" or "cognizable" group entitled to more
sensitive treatment belies the government's "policy" objection to Gelb's argu-
ment The government overstates its concern when it contends that all defend-
ants of all groups could insist on protection of their fair cross-section rights
.... The Supreme Court has narrowly limited the category of a distinctive or
cognizable group; it is not an issue which every defendant can invoke as to
every conceivable group.
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The Second Circuit's opinion does not discuss the merits of
inquiring into the religious or ethnic affiliations of the prospec-
tive jurors.12 The only hint of the court's position on the "need
Reply Brief for Appellant at 5 n.2. Gelb's position has support. See, e.g., Lockhart v.
McGee, 476 U.S. 162 (1986) (jurors absolutely opposed to the death penalty are not a
distinctive group for purposes of the fair cross-section requirement); United States v.
Canfield, 879 F.2d 446, 447 (8th Cir. 1989) (residents of the city of Minneapolis do not
share a clearly identifiable factor and are therefore not distinctive); Ford v. Seabold, 841
F.2d 677, 681 (6th Cir. 1988) (young adults and college students do not comprise distinc-
tive groups), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 928 (1988); United States v. Puleo, 817 F.2d 702, 706
(11th Cir. 1987) (jurors with last names beginning with the letters M-Z are not distinct),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 978 (1987); Ananya v. Hanson, 781 F.2d 1, 5-8 (blue collar and
less-educated individuals are not cognizable groups); United States v. Balistrierl, 778
F.2d 1226, 1229 (7th Cir. 1985) (rural community members not distinct), cert. denied 477
U.S. 908 (1986). Cf. United States v. Sanchez-Lopez, 879 F.2d 541, 547 (9th Cir. 1989)
(Hispanics comprise a distinct group); United States v. Herbert, 698 F.2d 981, 984 (9th
Cir. 1983) (Native Americans are a distinctive group), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 821 (1983).
Additionally, persons of various religious beliefs not yet classified by federal courts will
likely constitute cognizable groups since religion is covered by 28 U.S.C. § 1862 (1963),
which forbids discrimination in selecting jurors of any group based on their religious
beliefs.
'1 Such an inquiry will undoubtedly invade a juror's privacy interest in nondisclo-
sure. See, e.g., United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 130, 140 (2d Cir. 1979) (in which
the court indicated that people will be reluctant to serve as jurors if their personal con-
cerns are subject to probing and cited cases describing a general privacy interest). But
see Comment, supra note 114, at 792 (challenging the Barnes court's failure to suggest
the source of the interest or delineate its scope).
A personal inquiry may also plant a seed for bias where it would otherwise not exist.
See Harper, Rethinking Limitations on the Peremptory Challenge, 85 COLUM. L. REv.
1357, 1369 (1985). Jurors who would otherwise not have had any conscious thoughts re-
garding the sex, race, religion, ethnicity, or class of the defendant, may now speculate as
to why they are being asked intrusive questions. The jurors might take offense to the
questions and hold it against the defendant, or those in the same group as the defendant
may assume that they are supposed to support the defendant. In either case, by inquir-
ing, the court may be opening the door for prejudice, especially at the challenges stage of
voir dire. Attorneys will now know who is in a defendant's group and may use that infor-
mation in their exercise of peremptories-an exercise that may ultimately result in dis-
criminatory practices, raising Batson problems.
However, these considerations cannot blindly control every circumstance but rather
must be balanced against a possible deprivation of a defendant's constitutional right.
Most recently, a Queens judge has entered into the controversial area of questioning
potential jurors about their sexual orientation. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1991, at B3, col.
5 (In "gay bashing" murder case, Judge Ralph Sherman of New York State Supreme
Court asked one of the prospective jurors during voir dire whether she was homosexual
or bisexual.). For purposes of a Duren challenge this Comment balances the competing
interests between defendants' rights and potential jurors' rights by mandating an inquiry
into the personal lives of venire persons only after defendants do two things. A defend-
ant must make a prima facie showing of the systematic exclusion of a cognizable group
from jury service and the defendant must be unable to demonstrate affirmatively the
significant underrepresentation in the jury pool of that group by other means.
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to inquire" argument was the straightforward presentation of
how the jury was empaneled. Here the court noted that
"[d]uring voir dire, the court did not inquire into the religious
beliefs of prospective jurors, nor did Gelb's attorney request
such an inquiry. '128 In essence, the Second Circuit's underlying
position may have been that by failing to request such an in-
quiry the defendant waived his right to a fairly representative
jury venire.2 9
It is unfortunate that the Second Circuit did not affirma-
tively state that the defendant's conduct constituted a waiver of
his constitutional right. However, under the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, when a criminal defendant does not raise
defenses or objections that must be made prior to trial, those
arguments and defenses are waived.130 Therefore, since Gelb
never petitioned the district court to inquire about the religious
or ethnic background of his venire persons, this argument was
waived despite the defendant's post-appeal position to the con-
trary.3s Moreover, even if Gelb's request for an inquiry into the
128 Gelb, 881 F.2d at 1160.
129 Defendant's post-appeal brief lends support to this view. Petition for Rehearing
at 3 ("In its decision, the panel incorrectly read the record in concluding that Gelb had
failed to preserve his Sixth Amendment right to a balanced venire and petit jury.").
20 Specifically, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure state:
Failure by a party to raise defenses or objections or to make requests
which must be made prior to trial, at the time set by the court pursuant to
subdivision (c), or prior to any extension thereof made by the court, shall con-
stitute waiver thereof, but the court for cause shown may grant relief from the
waiver.
FED. iR CRa. P. 12(f). Gelb's attorneys apparently erred by not specifically petitioning
the court to ask jurors about their religious beliefs at voir dire. While it is unlikely that
Judge Van Sickle would have felt inclined to make such an inquiry, it seems, as a matter
of consistency, thoroughness and prudence, that Gelb's attorney should have requested
him to do so. Because Gelb did not formally ask for the inquiry, the Second Circuit now
had a quick "out" regarding Gelb's challenge-that since he did not ask for an inquiry
the district court did not have to make one. Had Gelb made such a request, and had he
been denied, the Second Circuit may have been unable to evade the question of whether
the district court was required to make such an inquiry. See text accompanying notes
133-38 infra describing the possible need for such an inquiry to insure the rights of de-
fendants raising religion- or ethnicity-based Sixth Amendment challenges.
121 In a last-ditch effort to shift the blame onto Judge Van Sickle for Gelb's owm
failure to request an inquiry, Gelb argues:
[lit is difficult to accept the concept that Gelb's constitutional right to a
fairly representative jury pool... should be deemed lost because Gelb's attor-
ney, after having vigorously focused Judge Van Sickle's attention on the jury
selection issue, did not take the additional step of suggesting religion.related
voir dire questions after Judge Van Sickle so categorically ruled that Je ws were
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religious and ethnic composition of his venire had been viewed
as retained, Gelb's failure to satisfy the systematic exclusion ele-
ment of the Duren test made this inquiry constitutionally
unnecessary. 3 2
3. The Danger of Gelb: Unequal Protection of the Fair
Cross-Section Requirement
By not exploring the merit of Gelb's surname argument, and
by the court's possible-albeit silent-validation of a judicial
policy of never needing to inquire into the religious or ethnic
affinities of prospective jurors, the Second Circuit may have cre-
ated a tremendous problem for any defendant seeking to raise a
religion- or ethnicity-oriented fair cross-section claim.133 Defend-
ants seeking to establish a Duren claim regarding the systematic
exclusion of cognizable religious or ethnic groups are left with
virtually no mechanism to prove the second element of signifi-
cant underrepresentation. A defendant will have tremendous
difficulty showing that a particular religious or ethnic group has
been significantly underrepresented if the court is unwilling to
accept the claimed lack of appropriate surnames as an inference
of the group's underrepresentation and is similarly unwilling to
place an affirmative duty on the trial court to conduct an inquiry
not a 'cognizable racial group.'
Petition for Rehearing at 3-4. The Second Circuit could have granted relief from the
waiver under the "cause shown" provision of Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, but declined to do so. See note 130 supra. Specifically the court could have
ruled that since Gelb's argument focused on the issue of the availability of potential
jurors, the district court's failure to inquire constituted reversible error. This Comment
has posited that the district court should treat the surname argument as a motion to
make an inquiry, if the court first rejects the lack of certain surnames as an indicator of
significant underrepresentation. See text accompanying note 113 supra.
,' See text accompanying notes 139-52 infra discussing defendant's failure to
demonstrate systematic exclusion.
183 In Gelb the court may not be validating a policy of not inquiring into the reli-
gious affinities of prospective jurors in a fair cross-section challenge, but rather, simply
restraining itself from deciding the question in this case - a course of action entirely
proper for a federal court. In another context the Second Circuit has expressly refused to
allow an inquiry into the ethnic background of jurors. Cf. United States v. Barnes, 604
F.2d 121, 140-41 (2d Cir. 1979) (where the court held that refusal to permit inquiry into
prospective jurors' ethnic backgrounds did not prevent the intelligent exercise of pe-
remptory challenges). In Barnes Judge Meskill dissented vigorously, arguing that the
district court's refusal to pose defendant's questions to jurors about their ethnic and
religious backgrounds hindered their ability "to exercise meaningfully their right to pe-
remptory challenge." Id. at 169 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
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into the religious or ethnic background of prospective jurors. In
evaluating race-based or gender-based jury selection challenges,
federal district courts can rely on the jury pool data assembled
from the juror qualification forms and effectively determine
whether that group has been significantly underrepresented.'
Thus, a Duren challenge of race or gender exclusion can be dis-
posed of fairly at this stage. Alternatively, if the defendant satis-
fies this element with statistics, the court will turn to the more
crucial element of systematic exclusion.1 35 However, no such
data exists regarding the religious or ethnic background of jurors
in the jury pool, making it very difficult to demonstrate certain
groups' significant underrepresentation 36 Rather, for a defend-
ant to make this showing district courts need to allow defend-
ants to demonstrate significant underrepresentation by the lack
of certain surnames from the venire or jury pool. Alternatively,
where this surname theory is inapplicable or not accepted, the
district court may need to inquire into the religious or ethnic
beliefs of venirepersons-where the defendant has made a prima
facie showing that a cognizable group has been systematically
excluded from potential service and where this prima facie
showing does not itself resolve the question of significant
underrepresentation.1 5 7
Having flatly rejected the surname theory raised in Duren
challenges as inherently unreliable, the Second Circuit has un-
warrantedly created a circumstance where potentially worthy
Duren defendants will be prevented from meeting the second el-
ement of the test (assuming the Gelb opinion is also read to pre-
clude inquiries into the religious or ethnic backgrounds of pro-
spective jurors for purposes of Duren). The undeniable
consequence of such an interpretation will be the unequal appli-
cation of the guarantee among criminal defendants.23 Addition-
' Federal juror qualification forms provide information about a potential juror's
race, date of birth, education, occupation and county of residence. 28 U.S.C. § 1862
(1963). See generally JuRywoRK, supra note 4, at §§ 6-10 to 6-12, discussing the sources
of jury pool composition data and the qualification process.
I" Central to this definition of the fair cross-section is the notion that no group be
underrepresented due to systematic exclusion in the selection process. See note 7 supra.
See note 15 supra.
See note 16 supra.
13 Defendants raising religion- or ethnicity-based fair cross-section challenges could
argue that by preventing them from showing proof of an element of a constitutional
violation, the court is denying them equal protection under the law. In essence, what is a
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ally, the court's overall treatment of the claim leaves the impres-
sion that any religion- or ethnicity-based fair cross-section
challenges are inconsequential and destined to fail.
B. Systematic Exclusion: A Better Resting Place
The Second Circuit could have easily disposed of this ap-
peal and in the process avoided potential equal protection
problems had it focussed on Gelb's failure to demonstrate ade-
quately that Jewish people were systematically excluded from
the jury pool.""9 Resting its decision on systematic exclusion
would have been analytically sound since the fundamental con-
cern of the fair cross-section requirement is whether any distinc-
tive group has been systematically excluded. 140 Moreover, had
the court considered this element, its decision would have been
firmly supported by the weight of the evidence rather than spec-
ulation and questionable policy from another circuit.1 41
Supreme Court Sixth Amendment decisions involving exclu-
sion of cognizable groups have focused on systematic exclusion
from jury pools. 142 Unlike the defendants in Duren and Tay-
fundamental right for defendants when investigating the exclusion of blacks or women
may not be a fundamental right when investigating the exclusion of a particular religious
or ethnic group.
119 The court found only that Gelb did not adequately demonstrate that his venire
lacked proper Jewish representation. Gelb, 881 F.2d at 1162.
140 This is the "fundamental" concern of the requirement because it is the source of
the underrepresentation that determines whether the constitutional guarantee has or has
not been violated. Note, supra note 1, at 1564 ("There is no right to have a particular
group represented on a'given... venire .... Protection, rather, is limited to an assur-
ance that no group will be systematically excluded, and a purely fortuitous deviation
from the ideal makeup of a jury does not in itself constitute a violation."). This is evi-
denced by the historical rhetoric concerning exclusionary practices (see text accompany-
ing note 19-25 supra) as well as the statutory shift towards randomness (see text accom-
panying notes 28-30 supra).
141 See text accompanying notes 84-95 supra.
142 See Harper, supra note 127, at 1365. See, e.g., Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357,
360 (1979) (Jury venires averaging less than 15% women over a period of about a year
where 54% of the population was female reflected "systematic exclusion."); Taylor v.
Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 531 (1975) (evidence of eleven months of disproportionate rep-
resentation was sufficient for finding systematic exclusion); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128,
131 (1940) (defendant showing that blacks were excluded from the grand jury over a
three-year period constituted "systematic" exclusion). See also Note, supra note 1, at
1565 ("federal. . . law will infer a systematic flaw only from significant underrepresenta-
tion on a number of previous venires"). In essence, Gelb needed to show this exclusion-
ary "practice" over the course of a year or two, although no case has authoritatively
determined the appropriate period of time. At a minimum, Gelb needed to show that
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lor,14s Gelb offered no statistical support for his contention that
the Eastern District's jury selection scheme systematically ex-
cluded Jewish people during this three-week period through an
unjustified exemption practice.1 " Nor did Gelb present data to
demonstrate a deficient number of Jewish people on other
venires during the time of his trial or evidence that the Jury
Administrator granted a statistically significant number of re-
quests by Jews for postponement of service prior to his trial. 14
As a result, Gelb did not meet his all-important prima facie bur-
den regarding the systematic exclusion prong of the Duren
standard.146
By not resting its decision on Gelb's lack of systematic ex-
clusion evidence, the Second Circuit left open the question of
systematic exclusion, offering no guidance on how properly
raised systematic exclusion arguments will fare in the Second
Circuit. In other words, had the court focused on what Gelb did
not do at this prong, it could have created standards that other
defendants would have to follow to satisfy the systematic exclu-
sion prong of Duren. Specifically, a functional exclusion princi-
ple would, under Duren, require more than mere affirmation by
the defendant of an exclusionary practice.1 47 To demonstrate
Jewish people were not excused in disproportionate numbers during this three-week pe-
riod by the jury system's commissioner, and were not excused to any great degree during
other times of the year. This would establish a prima facie showing of systematic exclu-
sion and would indicate the significant underrepresentation of Jewish jurors during this
time period as compared to the rest of the year.
1,3See notes 39 and 44 supra.
14 See note 152 infra discussing the "justification" of exclusionary procedures.
145 In Scott v. Dugger, 686 F. Supp. 1488 (S.D. Fla. 1988), aff'd, 891 F.2d 800 (11th
Cir. 1989), the defendant's Sixth Amendment fair cross-section challenge was rejected.
The state court judge in an earlier proceeding, Scott v. State, 411 So. 2d 886 (Fla. 1982),
denied defendant's motion for a one-day continuance since his trial was to begin on Yom
Kippur, even though E deputy clerk testified that she granted five postponement re-
quests due to the holiday. The court harshly found that the "appellant has failed to show
that his jury pool was in fact defective." 891 F.2d at 804. Gelb did not even go this far,
providing no affirmative evidence in support of this "practice," which his wife alleged in
her affidavit. See note 52 supra.
146 While the Second Circuit did not explicitly hold that Jews were not systemati-
cally excluded from Gelb's jury pool, in dicta it found that "the credible evidence shows
that Jews can absent themselves from the jury selection process only on the specific
dates of the holidays in question .... " Gelb, 881 F.2d at 1162 (emphasis added).
"I As noted (see note 52 supra), Gelb's sole source of evidence of systematic exclu-
sion was the self-serving affidavit submitted by his wife averring that someone at the
Clerk's Office of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York
informed her that Jews called to serve jury duty in September and October 1988 "would
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systematic exclusion, defendants would need to offer evidence of
more than significant underrepresentation on their own venires;
rather, defendants would have to establish tangible evidence of
significant underrepresentation on past venires. 14s Without such
evidence, defendants would fail to meet their prima facie bur-
den.149 However, the presence of such evidence would constitute
a satisfaction of this element of Duren-raising an inference
that the jury selection scheme improperly excluded that group
from service. 5 0 Thus, the burden would be shifted to the state
to justify its jury selection scheme as either nonexclusionarylor
be routinely excused from jury duty ... simply by writing to the Jury Administrator."
881 F.2d at 1159. Such "evidence" does not give rise to a prima facie showing of system-
atic exclusion. Cf. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986) (the plaintiff
could not survive a summary judgment motion by resting on his allegations of a conspir-
acy without offering any substantive evidence tending to support his complaint). Gelb's
showing is analogous to a state simply denying that its system is nonexclusionary. See
JURYWORK, supra note 4, at § 5-59 ("[R]ebuttal evidence must be affirmative and sub-
stantiated rather than negative (i.e., bare denials) and suppositional. For example, asser-
tions by selection officials that a racial disparity resulted from a lack of qualified blacks
are insufficient.") (citations omitted).
148 See note 142 supra discussing what Gelb needed to show to demonstrate system.
atic exclusion.
M Gelb's plea to the Second Circuit indicates a belief that almost any evidence will
suffice to satisfy a defendant's prima facie case. Reply Brief for Appellant at 6 ("In any
event, Duren requires only a prima facie showing of a systematic exclusion of a cogniza-
ble group from the venire and Gelb certainly made that showing.") (emphasis added).
Gelb pleaded to the Second Circuit that the district court's troubling view regarding
Jews as their own cognizable group "foreclose[d] any meaningful inquiry into the East-
em District's apparent practice in deferring Jewish individuals who were called for ser-
vice during the period of Jewish holidays encompassing Yom Kippur to Simchas Torah."
Brief for Appellant at 15. Adding to the litany of disrespect for the district court judge
(see note 54 supra), the defendant described Judge Van Sickle's efforts to come to grips
with the apparent practice of excusing Jewish jurors due to the holiday season as "super-
ficial." Brief for Appellant at 15.
While this Comment has argued for a less rigorous burden regarding the "significant
underrepresentation" element, a defendant cannot simply claim an exclusionary practice
by the jury selection system to satisfy the element of systematic exclusion. Gelb's pleas
rightly fell on deaf ears; the district court was under no obligation to make any efforts
because the burden of a prima facie showing was clearly on the defendant. Additionally,
unlike the district court's noninquiry into the religious beliefs of Gelb's jurors, on this
question the court did in fact seek to determine if there was an exclusionary prac-
tice-receiving assurances from the Chief Clerk that the Clerk's Office had engaged in no
such practice. Id.
100 Under this Comment's reading of Duren, defendants would still need to show
that their individual venires were in fact victimized by this exclusionary practice, as well
as satisfying the threshold element of whether the underrepresented group is legally
cognizable.
1"I Unlike a statute that facially excludes a group from the jury selection process, or
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or as reflecting a significant state interest.""2
prosecutorial conduct that evinces an exclusionary or discriminatory purpose in exclud-
ing jurors by peremptory challenges, the alleged systematic exclusion in Gelb concerns
"excuses" or "exemptions" for a specific period. There is no discriminatory purpose in
excusing potential Jewish jurors-only the possibility of a discriminatory impact. How-
ever, it is well-recognized that "when the defendant alleges violations of the Sixth
Amendment fair-cross-section principle, no showing of intent to discriminate is required
... systematic disproportion itself demonstrates an infringement of the defendant's in-
terest in a jury chosen from a fair community cross section ... ." People v. Harris, 36
Cal. 3d 36, 57, 679 P.2d 443, 445, 201 Cal. Rptr. 782, 794 (quoting Duren). Whether such
an impact, without any invidiousness, satisfied the "systematic exclusion" prong in this
instance was a question the Gelb court did not have to consider since the defendant did
not show evidence of systematic exclusion. Had he done so, this practice would likely
have been viewed as satisfying Duren's systematic exclusion prong. See, e.g., Duren 439
U.S. at 367 (court found that a statute which did not affirmatively exclude women, but
rather, gave them an automatic exemption from service if they requested one, satisfied
the systematic exclusion prong of Duren). In his dissent in Duren, Justice Rehnquist
argued that "the Court uses the word 'exclusion' contrary to any use of the word with
which I am familiar." Id. at 374. See also People v. Marrero, 110 A.D.2d 785, 487
N.Y.S.2d 853 (2d Dep't 1985) (finding the fact that voir dire was conducted on the Jew-
ish holiday of Succoth did not evince deliberate or systematic exclusion of members of
the Jewish faith, thus rejecting defendant's fair cross-section claim). The potential im-
pact of a finding of systematic exclusion in Gelb cannot be overstated. If there had been
a systematic holiday season exemption, and the court held it to satisfy the systematic
exclusion prong, the practical consequence would have been that any venire showing sig-
nificant Jewish underrepresentation as a result of this practice would have been a Duren
violation. All trials in this district during this time period would theoretically have to be
postponed, effectively closing down the court system-a ludicrous result. The govern-
ment's policy concerns become more viable in this context; however, the result of such a
finding would be the abandonment of that practice of excusing jurors for more than the
day of the holiday. See note 126 supra.
152 Duren describes this burden-shifting procedure:
The demonstration of a prima facie fair cross-section violation by the de-
fendant is not the end of the inquiry into whether a constitutional violation
has occurred. We have explained that "States remain free to prescribe relevant
qualifications for their jurors and to provide reasonable exemptions so long as
it may be fairly said that the jury lists or panels are representative of the com-
munity. However... 'the right to a proper jury cannot be overcome on merely
rational grounds'. [Taylor, 419 U.S. at 534]." Rather, it requires that a signifi-
cant state interest be manifestly and primarily advanced by those aspects of
the jury selection process, such as exemption criteria, that result in the dispro-
portionate exclusion of a distinctive group.
Duren, 457 U.S. at 367-68 (citations omitted).
Had Gelb been able to demonstrate systematic exclusion, along with the other
Duren elements, the government would have had the opportunity to justify the exclu-
sionary practice of excusing Jewish jurors for the holiday season, as opposed to calling
them for service and excusing them on specific holiday dates. See, e.g., Duren, 439 U.S.
at 370 (where the Court rejected the state's rebuttal position that women should be al-
lowed to claim an exemption for domestic reasons as not manifesting a significant
enough state interest); but cf. Rawlins v. Georgia, 201 U.S. 638, 640 (1906) (where the
Court found that a state may exclude special occupational categories from jury service on
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CONCLUSION
Gelb is a Second Circuit decision with tremendous implica-
tions for defendants' fair cross-section guarantees. The decision
inadequately evaluates the possible exclusion of religious or eth-
nic groups from jury selection procedures. Under the three-
prong fair cross-section standard established by Duren, the Gelb
court's discussion suggests that defendants can never rely on
"stereotypical" evidence to demonstrate the significant under-
representation of a legally cognizable group from the jury pool
or venire. Critical examination reveals that the Second Circuit's
opinion is shortsighted because there may be no other way to
show the possible underrepresentation of religious or ethnic
groups. The court also neglects the possibility that district
courts may ultimately need to inquire into the religious or ethnic
affiliations of the venire members in order to know if a group is
underrepresented. Moreover, the Second Circuit's decision is
poorly focused and analytically deficient since it does not ad-
dress the more provocative element of Duren-the notion of a
jury selection scheme that systematically excludes a legally dis-
tinct group.
The consequences of the Second Circuit's treatment of the
fair cross-section requirement in Gelb are troubling. Future
courts are left without any guidance for when a religion-based
inquiry is necessary to insure all defendants equal constitutional
guarantees. Defendants are without guidance as to how they are
supposed to demonstrate the significant underrepresentation of
a religious or ethnic group when they contend that there is a
systematic practice of excluding this group. Courts are also left
without standards for evaluating when an exclusionary practice
gives rise to a constitutional violation. In essence, the Gelb deci-
sion leaves the fair cross-section requirement nonfunctional in
the context of religion- or ethnicity-based challenges.
For purposes of this guarantee, district courts must be sen-
sitive to the near-impossible task facing defendants seeking to
demonstrate the significant underrepresentation of religious or
ethnic groups for which no readily available data exist. Where
applicable, the lack of certain surnames in disproportionate
the grounds that it is in the community's best interest if their regular work is not
interrupted).
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numbers from a defendant's venire should be credited as prima
facie evidence of significant underrepresentation, thereby shift-
ing the analysis to whether the defendant can prove that this
group has somehow been systematically excluded from jury ser-
vice. If the surname theory is discredited or inapplicable, district
courts, upon request from the defendant, will need to permit an
inquiry into the religious or ethnic backgrounds of venireper-
sons. This inquiry should be allowed where the defendant has
brought forth prima facie evidence that a cognizable group has
been systematically excluded, yet the evidence does not confirm
defendant's allegations that this group has been significantly
underrepresented.
Lastly, the court's overall treatment of Gelb's challenge in-
dicates that religion- or ethnicity-based jury selection challenges
are not favorably received and have little hope of success. It is
evident that challenges like Gelb's will not receive the sort of
principled evaluation that race- or gender-based jury selection
challenges traditionally receive. As a result, the Second Circuit's
decision has the ultimate consequence of undermining the Sixth
Amendment's fair cross-section requirement for all defendants
seeking to show the underrepresentation of religious or ethnic
groups.
Mark A. Kornfeld
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